Ship Happens

Minimal security for AI startups.

Dr. Gaurav Manek
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2026-11-12

Talk and slides

About Me



Dr. Gaurav Manek

- Founder, **Ocellivision**
- Technical Lead, **ORBIT** @ IMCB
- **PhD** in AI/ML — Carnegie-Mellon University (2023)
- Founder, **Visigoth.ai** (SaaS)

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
Ship Fast Without Shipping Holes

Summer Yue reported her agent deleting emails.[1]

User-reported incident

I had to run to my Mac mini like I was defusing a bomb.

– Summer Yue



A local example: Bee Cheng Hiang

95,364

customer emails exposed.[2]

Nobody inspected the test email.

AI-assisted marketing script; not an autonomous agent.


THE STRAITS TIMES

Bee Cheng Hiang customers' e-mail addresses exposed in first case of AI-related data breach in S'pore

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
Infrastructure-based Safety For Your Claw



One API call deleted PocketOS's production database.[4]

The agent found an account-wide token on disk.

The dashboard had a deletion delay. The API didn't.



Replit wiped the entire production db of SaaStr.AI.[5]

The Problem

“LLM accident” is not a diagnosis, its a thought-terminating cliché.

It is like writing “pilot error” in an air-crash report.

Bad framing

- all blame to the operator
- the fault was not foreseeable
- no explanatory value

→

Useful framing

- design defends against operator mistakes
- failure modes are predictable
- points to concrete safeguards

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Useful framing

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- failure modes are predictable
- points to concrete safeguards

We don’t make humans perfect.

We design systems that stay safe when humans are imperfect.

When Designing Infrastructure

1. **Constrain**
   Limit access and authority.
2. **Pace**
   Use approvals and action limits.
3. **Observe**
   Verify actual tool outcomes.
4. **Recover**
   Stop harm; rehearse recovery.

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
Four practical habits for containing mistakes.

Enforce them in the tools and infrastructure.


While remaining powerful enough to be *useful*.

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IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI[6]
Risk assessment, policies and oversight.



NIST AI RMF 1.0[7]
Govern, Map, Measure, Manage



OWASP[8]
Agentic AI: Threats and Mitigations

While remaining powerful enough to be *useful*.

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For when you want to sell your startup:


INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 42001

Information technology — Artificial intelligence — Management system


ISO/IEC 42001[9]
AI management systems

While remaining powerful enough to be *useful*.

1. Constrain: Limit Access and Authority

Mistake: deletes the inbox.[10]

User-reported incident




Injection: publishes private data.[11]

Research demonstration

2025-05-26

GitHub MCP Exploited: Accessing private repositories via MCP

We showcase a critical vulnerability with the official GitHub MCP server, allowing attackers to access private repository data. The vulnerability is among the first discovered by Invariant's security analyzer for detecting toxic agent flows.



1. Constrain: Limit Access and Authority

Principles

1. **Give each agent one specific, narrowly scoped task.**
   The fewer different things it has to do, the simpler the permissions.

2. **Give it only the tools, data and permissions that task requires.**
   Enforce permissions at the smallest granularity possible.

3. **Enforce boundaries through infrastructure.**
   The agent cannot bypass the controls, change its permissions or obtain broader credentials.

NIST: least privilege[12] · OWASP: excessive agency[13] · IMDA: agent limits[6]

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Implementation examples


1. Keep credentials outside the agent's execution environment.
2. Every route to the agent must cross a security boundary.
3. Sensitive writes use narrow operations with deterministic checks.

Common strategies

- Agents that read broadly write only to a fixed, authorized destination.
- Agents that read private data have restricted subsequent outputs.
- Agents that read hostile content get no consequential tools.

2. Pace: Review Before Consequence

Acts before permission.[14]



Replit · user-reported incident · July 2025

Thinks beyond useful limits.[15]

Try Claude

Chapter 01: A change to Claude Code's default reasoning effort

A change to Claude Code's default reasoning effort

When we released Opus 4.6 in Claude Code in February, we set the default reasoning effort to `high`.

Soon after, we received user feedback that Claude Opus 4.6 in high effort mode would occasionally think for too long, causing the UI to appear frozen and leading to disproportionate latency and token usage for those users.

In general, the longer the model thinks, the better the output. Effort levels are how Claude Code lets users set that tradeoff—more thinking versus lower latency and fewer usage limit hits. As we calibrate effort levels for our models, we take this tradeoff into account in order to pick points along the test-time-compute curve that give people the best range of options. In the product layer, we then choose which point along this curve we set as our default, and that is the value we send to the Messages API as the effort parameter; we then make the other options available via `/effort`.

Anthropic · provider postmortem · April 2026

2. Pace: Review Before Consequence

Principles

1. **Human review before consequential actions.**
   Send, pay, publish, delete: decide which steps require approval.

2. **Approve the exact action that will execute.**
   Show the target, contents and impact. Changes require fresh approval.

3. **Bound how far the agent can go without you.**
   Enforce limits on batches, calls, retries, runtime and spend outside the model.

IMDA: meaningful oversight[6] · NIST: human roles[7] · OWASP: approvals[16] and limits[17]

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Implementation examples

1. Draft ⟶ preview ⟶ approve ⟶ execute.
2. Approvals are expiring, single-use, and bound to the exact agent and action.
3. Cap retries and deduplicate consequential requests.
4. Start with a small batch; approve expansion.
5. Enforce spend and runtime caps.

3. Observe: Verify What Actually Happened

Tests pass. The verifier was changed.[18]

OBSERVED DURING MODEL TRAINING



Original OpenAI research trace: model edits verifier to pass.

Describes a demo. Submits.[19]

PROVIDER-REPORTED EVALUATION INCIDENTS

> In another evaluation, Claude Haiku 4.5 was instructed to complete a form up until the final submission stage, but to stop before actually submitting. Several times Claude mistakenly submitted the form instead, expecting there to be an additional confirmation page. In these instances, the model's chain-of-thought stated that it was demonstrating the process, not submitting a real request.

Transcript review uncovered unintended actions.

3. Observe: Verify What Actually Happened

Principles

1. **Verify tool outcomes against independent evidence.**
   Check the destination or stored state, not just the agent's report.

2. **Keep evidence outside the agent's control.**
   Protect logs and test checks; alert a named owner to dangerous outcomes.

3. **Continuously test the application and its boundaries.**
   Test forbidden calls directly and through hostile inputs.

OWASP: application testing[20] · IMDA: protected logs and monitoring[6] · NIST: red-teaming and reassessment[21]

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Implementation examples

1. Correlate tool requests, policy decisions and actual outcomes.
2. Alert a named owner to forbidden actions and missing telemetry.
3. Automate multi-turn attacks through retrieved content and tools.
4. Grade outcomes with checks the agent cannot change.
5. Rerun evals after changes.

Observe: Instrument and attack-test

Observability


Langfuse[22] · **Opik**[23] · **Phoenix**[24]
LLM traces and evaluations.

Jaeger[25]
Distributed request tracing.


Prompt fuzzing / red teaming

Promptfoo[26] · **PyRIT**[27] · **garak**[28]
Automated adversarial testing.

Abliterated LLMs as attackers
e.g. served by **OrcaRouter**.[29]



4. Recover: Stop Harm and Restore Service



DataTalks.Club: recovery took 24 hours.

26 February 2026 · Operator postmortem.[30]

> Thank you very much for your continued patience while our internal team was working on the snapshot restoration process.
>
> I am pleased to inform you that the team has confirmed the snapshot is now successfully available and ready for use.

Claude Code destroyed production infrastructure and automated snapshots. AWS support recovered a snapshot; the operator restored the service.

Afterward: separate backups and daily automated restore tests.

4. Recover: Stop Harm and Restore Service

Principles

1. **Stop execution without the model's cooperation.**
   Have mechanisms to disable tools & credentials, pause in-flight work.

2. **Protect the recovery path from the agent.**
   Keep versioned backups and restore credentials outside its authority.

3. **Rehearse restoration before you need it.**
   Verify the data and a working user flow; measure time and lost work.

4. **Restoration cannot recall disclosed information.**
   Rotate leaked credentials, inform affected users promptly.

OWASP: emergency off-switches[31] · NCSC: protected, tested backups[32] · NIST: verified recovery[33]

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
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OWASP: emergency off-switches[31] · NCSC: protected, tested backups[32] · NIST: verified recovery[33]

Implementation examples

1. Independent emergency stop.
2. Quarantine jobs; reconcile effects before resuming.
3. Protected, versioned backups.
4. Separate code and data recovery plans.
5. Verified restore before reconnecting.
6. Monthly UAT drill and recovery receipt.



The AI wheel of misfortune
Proposed practice: one bounded UAT drill.

Known baseline → inject failure → recover → verify → keep the receipt.

UAT is isolated from production; success does not prove production recovery time.[34]

One useful inbox agent. Four safeguards.

Constrain

Relevant mail. Drafts. No permanent deletion.

Pace

Exact-action approval. Small batches. Execution caps.

Observe

Actual tool outcomes. Adversarial regression tests.

Recover

Independent stop. Protected backups. Practised restore.

Constrain. Pace. Observe. Recover.

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Ask your agent to apply a framework and give you suggestions:



IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI[6]



NIST AI RMF 1.0[7]



OWASP[8]



ISO/IEC 42001[9]

Talk and slides

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